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WHY FOOD PRICES ARE LIKELY 
TO BECOME MORE UNSTABLE
Franck Galtier1
Many food prices are already unstable, both on international 
and national markets. Since food products account for a large 
share of household expenditure in many low-income countries, 
especially the poorest ones, sharp price increases have a very 
negative impact on food and nutrition security. Some households 
need to reduce their food consumption level or diversity, 
causing possible calorie or nutrient deficiencies, with possibly 
irreversible effects, especially for young children (Glewwe, Jacoby 
and King, 2001). Equally, price collapses affect food production 
and investment: as farmers are facing a huge market risk, they 
are not willing to invest and banks or microfinance institutions 
are not willing to lend them money. Food price volatility is likely 
to increase in the future for the reasons explained below.
Increased vulnerability to shocks 
Food markets are already highly vulnerable to shocks. This is 
because there is no mechanism to guarantee that stock levels 
are adequate to absorb significant shocks in supply or demand. 
Stocks usually have a stabilising effect on prices because storers 
usually buy when prices are low (thereby reducing the quantity 
available on the market and exerting an upward pressure on the 
price) and sell when prices are high (thereby releasing quantities 
on the market and exerting a downward pressure on the price). 
This mechanism applies to both private storers and the food 
reserve agencies that manage public stocks. However, if stock 
levels are sometimes sufficient (after successive good harvests), 
they are sometimes too low, allowing for sharp price increases, 
as illustrated by the international grain markets (European 
Commission, 2018). 
The trends analysed in Chapter 5.2 are likely to increase the 
vulnerability of food markets. Some world regions, especially 
Africa, will become more dependent on food imports and 
therefore more vulnerable to trade shocks. We note here that 
WTO disciplines on export restrictions are extremely weak and 
export bans were enforced by many exporting countries during 
the 2008 crisis, thereby penalising countries which import rice 
and wheat. 
Increased supply shocks
Climate change
Although climate change impact studies have mainly focused 
on changes in mean climate, IPCC (2012) acknowledges the 
fact that “a changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, 
intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of weather and 
S U M M A R Y
Extreme food price volatility is extremely 
damaging to food and nutrition security. It is likely 
to increase in the future because: (i) food markets 
will probably become more vulnerable to shocks; 
(ii) supply shocks can be expected to increase 
because of climate change, emerging diseases 
and armed conflicts that could affect production 
and trade; (iii) demand shocks are predicted to rise 
due to the growing links between the food, energy 
and financial markets.
1. CIRAD, UMR MOISA, F-34398 Montpellier, France; 
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CHAPTER 5.3
climate extremes, and can result in unprecedented 
extremes.” Changes in extreme events have been 
observed since 1950. Further changes may occur 
in the future, although there is no certainty about 
this in the IPCC projections. Current knowledge 
on the impacts of increased climate variability and 
extreme events have been reviewed by Thornton et 
al. (2014). Temperature extremes are expected to 
reduce yields: “rice yields [would be] reduced by 90% 
with night temperatures of 32°C compared to 27°C,” 
[whereas] “in maize, each degree day spent above 30°C 
can reduce yield by 1.7% under drought conditions.” 
“High temperature extremes during grain filling can 
affect the protein content of wheat grain” (Thornton et 
al., 2014). Changes in rainfall variability or seasonal 
patterns (both droughts and floods) are the principal 
cause of inter-annual yield variability (cf. Section 2). 
The probable increase in the frequency of extreme 
climate events is likely to render food production 
more unstable, at least in some parts of the world, 
thereby increasing price instability on national and 
international markets.
Emerging diseases
Emerging infectious diseases are diseases whose 
incidence has increased in the past 20 years and 
could increase in the near future (cf. Chapter 2.4). 
Climate warming may contribute to boosting their 
development (for more details on this, see FAO 
2018). Emerging diseases can affect plants, animals 
and humans. They could lead to more unstable 
food prices by affecting production and trade. For 
example, it is estimated that by generating labour 
shortages, the Ebola virus disease outbreak that 
affected West Africa in 2014 led to reductions in rice 
production of 11.6 percent in Liberia, 8 percent in 
Sierra Leone and 3.7 percent in Guinea (FAO, 2016). In 
addition, it disrupted the local rice trade both within 
and between countries because of traders’ fears of 
harvesting rice in affected areas and government 
decisions to close markets and borders. This resulted 
in worse connections between surplus and deficit 
areas, leading to both increases and decreases in 
prices.   
Conflicts 
Armed conflicts are already a huge problem in 
some regions of the world, including the Sahel. The 
probability of future conflicts is likely to increase 
with the growth of climate-driven migration and 
rising pressure on resources such as land and water. 
Analysis of existing conflicts shows that they can affect 
food supply by reducing production, disrupting trade 
or causing stock theft or destruction (as occurred 
with jihadist movements in northern Mali). The way in 
which Boko Haram’s attacks affect agricultural market 
activity has been studied in 112 markets located in 
northern Nigeria and in 2,429 reported conflicts for 
the period July 2009 to November 2016 (Van Den 
Hoek, 2017). Conflicts have been found to reduce 
market activity even though less than 2 percent of 
them occurred at or near markets. 
Increased demand shocks
As food markets will be increasingly linked to energy 
and financial markets, food prices will increasingly be 
affected by the shocks that occur on these markets.
Growing links between energy and food markets
Because of methodological challenges, the many 
econometrical studies carried out show diverging 
results regarding whether the instability of energy 
prices is transmitted to food prices (for a review, 
see HLPE, 2013). However, the more comprehensive 
and reliable approach (based on estimating the 
‘break-even point’ for a given food product, i.e. the 
price level below which using it to produce biofuel 
is profitable) clearly shows that the price of maize is 
driven by its break-even point, which in turn depends 
on the dynamics of ethanol and natural gas prices 
(cf. Figure 22 and HLPE, 2013). This is not the case for 
vegetable oils because their price is higher than their 
break-even point. In the future, the role of energy 
prices as drivers for food prices is likely to increase 
because of the on-going development of biofuel 
production in many emerging countries (HLPE, 2013) 
and the likely increase in energy prices (cf. Chapter 
5.2). The price of food products not directly used to 
produce biofuels may also become more unstable 
because when there are sharp increases in energy 
prices, land and scarce inputs are likely to be diverted 
from food products to energy feedstock crops. 
Within a few decades, the phenomenon may go 
beyond energy. To solve the problems related 
to increasing pollution and emerging scarcity of 
resources, biomass will probably be increasingly 
used for materials, as had been the case since the 
beginning of human history until the industrial 
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Figure 22: Biofuel production capacities (since 2007) 
resulted in a strong relationship 
between maize prices and energy prices. 
Source: HLPE, 2013.
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revolution of the nineteenth century (Daviron, 
forthcoming). This return to a ‘solar economy’ (an 
economy based mainly on renewable energies) is 
likely to link food prices to the prices of all their non-
food substitutes.
Growing links between financial and food markets 
Food markets are being progressively linked to 
financial markets because agricultural futures 
markets are increasingly used by speculators 
following market deregulation at the end of the 
Grain prices are already highly volatile in the Sahel region, 
causing huge food crises. In Sahel countries, poor households 
mainly consume coarse grains (millet, sorghum and local maize 
varieties), whose production is highly sensitive to natural hazards 
(mainly droughts and locust attacks). It is difficult to offset 
deficits with imports because these grains are not available on 
international markets and the grains available (rice and wheat) 
are much more expensive. Therefore, coarse grain prices spike 
when harvests are bad (they increased by 150 percent in 2005 
and 80 percent in 2012), provoking food crises and famines. 
Grain price volatility is expected to increase still further in the 
future for two reasons. The first is related to climate change. 
Over the past decade, “the Sahelian rainfall regime [has been] 
characterized by a lasting deficit of the number of rainy days, while at 
the same time the extreme rainfall occurrence is on the rise” (Panthou 
et al., 2014). This more extreme climate is likely to increase the 
instability of food production. In addition, the seasonal pattern 
of rainfall has evolved: peak rainfall has shifted from late August 
(before the 1970s) to mid-August, therefore increasing the 
risk of water stress at the end of the millet production cycle. 
Projections for the late twenty-first century “reveal an extension 
of torrid climates throughout West Africa. In addition, the Sahel, 
predominantly semi-arid in present-day conditions, is projected to 
face moderately persistent future arid climate. […] Consequently, 
West Africa evolves towards increasingly torrid, arid and semi-arid 
regimes with the recession of moist and wet zones mostly because 
of the temperature forcing, although precipitation can be locally an 
important factor. […] Such changes point towards an increased risk 
of water stress for managed and unmanaged ecosystems” (Sylla et 
al., 2016). These developments may have a very strong impact as 
Sahelian countries are often ranked among the countries most 
vulnerable to climate change. For example,  Chad had the world’s 
highest Climate Change Vulnerability Index in 2016 and Niger the 
third highest. 
Another source of increased food price instability is the expected 
increase in the frequency and magnitude of conflicts. Armed 
conflicts are already a problem in the region, with the insecurity 
generated by jihadist or separatist movements disrupting 
production, trade and income (Van Den Hoek, 2017). The situation 
may worsen in the future because the likelihood of conflicts 
will rise with climate-driven migration. This kind of migration is 
already a reality (more than 500,000 people were displaced in 
Niger because of floods in 2012) and is likely to increase in the 
future (in terms of both people and distance). Another source of 
concern is related to the increasing pressure on land and water. 
This is a worldwide issue, but is likely to be particularly acute in 
the Sahel region due to the significant population growth that will 
occur over the coming decades.
twentieth century. Indeed, the proportion of contracts 
held by speculators jumped from 23 percent in 1998 
to 69 percent in 2008 (Masters and White, 2008). 
Although the responsibility of excessive speculation 
in the 2008 food price boom is controversial (Masters 
and White, 2008; Sanders et al., 2008), the growing 
nexus between financial and food markets is likely to 
foster an increasing transmission of the instability of 
financial markets to food prices. ●
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